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Abstract 
This article traces the enduring influence of the dirigiste traditions on contemporary 
French macroeconomic policymaking, arguing that French policy both within and 
towards the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is consistent with long-standing French 
dirigiste preferences and policy traditions. Specifically it explores how, within the SGP, 
French governments have created and defended significant fiscal policy space, and how 
the scope for discretionary policy-making has in fact been enhanced by the credibility 
accrued through European rule-based governance. Furthermore, it analyses how, in their 
policies towards the SGP, French governments have successfully influenced the 
reshaping of the fiscal policy architecture, introducing a more dirigiste interventionism in 
the interpretation and implementation of the SGP, loosening constraints in accordance 
with dirigiste preferences. French policymakers have thus played a ‘long-run game’ with 
European economic governance – initially accepting ordo-liberal orthodoxy, only to 
subsequently ‘move the goalposts’ in a more dirigiste direction. 
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The New Political Economy of Dirigisme: French Macroeconomic 
Policy, Unrepentant Sinning, and the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
Introduction 
Dirigisme denotes the French tradition of directive state intervention in economic 
activity. Underpinned by the Republican étatiste tradition (Hazareesingh 1994, chs 3 and 
6; Dyson 1980, 27-9), state intervention in economic activity in France has been 
predicated upon the state conceived as ‘guiding force’, providing capitalism with the 
necessary direction. A concept central to understand such dirigiste policy impulses is the 
French term volontarisme. This refers to an activist, interventionist economic policy 
approach which places emphasis on the discretionary actions of policy-makers. The state, 
dirigisme assumes, should operate as an organiser and regulator of economic activity, a 
protector of the public sector, and as a strategic actor (Dyson 1980, 95-7; Schmidt 1996, 
73-93; Schmidt 1997, 229). What flowed from this model was a presumption on the part 
of administrative, economic and political elites, and on the part of the wider populace, 
that the agencies of the French State could and should actively intervene in the economic 
and industrial sphere. In the second half of the 20th Century, this dirigiste tradition of state 
intervention became associated with a distinctive French ‘model’ of capitalism allied to a 
‘developmental state’, which sought to deliver economic growth and full employment 
(Zysman 1983). 
 
The post-war French model of state-led industrial development involved an actively 
interventionist, dirigiste, ‘player’ state using its key agencies to steer the nation’s 
economic development (Shonfield 1969, ch. 5; Hall 1986). This French dirigiste model 
was predicated upon a set of coordinating and steering mechanisms. The policy 
mechanisms included, firstly, price, credit and exchange controls. Secondly there were 
norms of tutelle (or hands-on supervision) over key (public and private) industries, 
involving ‘an intricate network of commitments on the part of private firms... all in return 
for favours from the state... [and] the habit of the exercise of power by public officials 
over the private sector of the economy’ (Shonfield 1969, 86 and 128). The final element 
was state orchestration of industrial finance through the plan.  
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The core macroeconomic policy-making feature of this model was the French state’s 
inability to control the inflationary growth of credit, compounded by ‘the consensual 
refusal of the state, the trade unions, and the employers to control nominal changes in 
incomes and prices’ (E. Cohen 1995, 26). Cohen has termed the resultant policy regime 
an ‘inflationist social compromise’ (1995). The macroeconomic policy elements of 
France’s postwar dirigiste ‘model’ were predicated upon ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 
1982), a regulated exchange rate international economic order, involving fairly extensive 
capital controls, codified at Bretton Woods. The ‘competitive devaluations’ and levels of 
state spending and state debt that this context permitted were a necessary condition of the 
success of France’s ‘overdraft economy’ (Loriaux 1991, 10-14). As that system 
unravelled amidst increasing, and increasingly unregulated, capital flows in the 1960s 
(Strange 1976; de Vries 1976), followed in the 1970s by the Nixon shock, oil crises, and 
further augmented liberalisation and deregulation, France’s dirigiste policy paradigm 
came under increasing strain. International financial liberalisation rendered the dirigiste 
‘credit rationing’ approach to monetary policy (encadrement du crédit) increasingly 
unworkable (E. Cohen 1996, 351).   
 
The instinctive expectation of public direction of economic activity, and a presumption in 
favour of the role of the state bureaucracy steering the tiller of national economic 
development began to conflict with international trends towards deregulation, 
privatization and liberalization, not to mention stringent EU anti-trust directives. As a 
result, the political economy of dirigiste interventionism, and the balance between state 
and market that underpinned it, evolved. The French State worked increasingly with the 
grain of the market, with state agencies seeing their role as facilitators of the strategic 
restructuring of the French model of capitalism along more market-oriented lines. 
 
In an international political economic context of the 1990s and 2000s that differs 
markedly from ‘embedded liberalism’, dirigisme is articulated in a different manner, and 
is more circumspect in nature. Yet this has not heralded the end of Shonfield’s ‘habit of 
the exercise of power by public officials over … the economy’ (1969, 128), nor the 
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demise directive state interventionism within the French political economy. Dirigiste and 
volontariste instincts and policy approaches endure, despite French government’s means 
to direct the economy (through ‘old-style’ dirigisme) being reduced. The size of the 
French public sector remains large by comparative standards. France has the highest 
share of government expenditure and employment among European countries outside of 
the Nordic ones (OECD 2000: 62), and the public sector enjoys a peculiar importance 
within the French constitutional nexus (Cole 1999). Despite assertions regarding sharply 
reduced macroeconomic policy autonomy and the abandonment of the Keynesian 
paradigm as the dominant French macroeconomic policy referential in the 1980s (Lordon 
2001: 116-119), the role of automatic stabilisers, and contra-cyclical budget deficits has 
by no means disappeared. The analysis of French fiscal policy making since the early 
1990s below illustrates a considerable degree of dirigiste policy autonomy.  
 
This article traces the enduring influence of dirigiste policy traditions on contemporary 
French macroeconomic policymaking, arguing that French policy both within and 
towards the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is consistent with French dirigiste 
preferences. Within the SGP, scope for discretionary policy-making has in fact been 
enhanced by the credibility accrued through European rule-based governance. Recent 
French governments have created and defended significant fiscal policy space, despite the 
context of deteriorating public finances and a slowdown across the Eurozone after 2001. 
Even as the French debt situation worsened, France was afforded greater margin of 
manoeuvre by international financial markets. Furthermore, French policymakers are 
playing a ‘long-run game’ – challenging a prevailing Ordo-liberal (see Ryner 2003, 203-
7) orthodoxy stressing price stability, and the independence of monetary policy from 
political interference that has shaped the architecture of the Euro. In their policies 
towards the SGP, French governments have successfully influenced the reshaping of the 
fiscal policy architecture, introducing a more dirigiste interventionism in the 
interpretation and implementation of the SGP, and loosening constraints in accordance 
with dirigiste preferences.  
 
© Ben Clift, 2006.         Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK 4
The New Political Economy of Dirigisme 
After setting out French dirigiste preferences with regard to SGP reform, this article 
briefly assesses enduring volontarisme in French fiscal policy-making, interpreted here as 
evidence of enduring dirigiste interventionist preferences and capabilities amongst 
policymakers. It then explores intentional re-engineering of the supra-national fiscal 
policy framework of the euro in order both to expand domestic room to manoeuvre, but 
also as an attempt to re-articulate dirigiste policy approaches at the supra-national level. 
 
Playing a Dirigiste Long Game 
 
Dirigiste policy traditions are evolving in response to the changing supra-national context 
within which macroeconomic policy is formulated since the advent of the Euro. French 
policymakers pursue a dual-level dirigiste approach combining domestic volontarisme 
with expanding room to manoeuvre through EU-level activism (see Clift 2005). Here, 
competitive disinflation, and thereafter a strongly German influenced architecture of 
EMU are interpreted as exercises in building up necessary credibility, which French 
policymakers saw as a first phase in a ‘long-run game’ which would in turn create room 
to manoeuvre hopefully providing opportunities to ‘move the goalposts’ at a later stage 
(Clift 2003b).   
 
French efforts to shift the goal posts of EMU, inserting more scope for volontarisme to 
counter the perceived ‘monetarism’ of the European Central Bank (ECB), crystallised 
into the proposal for an ‘economic government’ (EG) as a political counterweight to the 
ECB (Dyson & Featherstone 1999, 172-245). These proved ultimately unsuccessful in 
the 1990s, sacrificed in the face of unstinting German hostility (Howarth, 2001 & 2002). 
When this earlier strategy failed, the nature of the ‘long-run game’ French policymakers 
were playing with the institutions of European economic governance changed. 
 
French policy elites found that both the political support (notably with German 
difficulties in meeting Pact targets) and the opportunities for something akin to the 
reorientations to EMU that the likes of Mitterrand and Bérégovoy had sought at 
Maastricht presented themselves in the years immediately following its inception in 1999.  
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A combination of the credibility secured through SGP rules, and the political context of a 
Franco-German axis on deficit forgiveness, created areas of room to manoeuvre, notably 
in revising the interpretation and implementation of the SGP to align more closely with 
French dirigiste preferences. Thus the ‘long game’ French policymakers were ‘playing’ 
with European economic governance (Clift 2003b) has been successful. Policy space has 
been opened up, albeit not in the way anticipated, and not on the ‘Euro-Keynesian’ scale 
hoped for by some French policy-makers (Jospin 1999; 2001). 
 
The Mitterrand Experiment and Declining Fiscal Policy Autonomy 
 
The French case is often cited as powerful testament to the power of global finance to 
erode policy autonomy (Andrews 2001; B. Cohen 1996, 281; Helleiner 1994, 140-144; 
Halimi et al 1994). The Mitterrand era began with an ambitious ‘redistributive 
Keynesian’ (Hall, 1986) demand-boost and a dash for growth in the context of a world 
slump. However, within two years, a ballooning trade gap led to balance of payments 
problems which generated financial crises (Muet & Fonteneau 1985).  The resultant 
external pressures, perhaps most importantly in the form of commitments involved in 
staying in the European Monetary System (EMS), proved incompatible with this macro-
economic stance (Hall 1986; Cameron 1996; Lombard 1995).   
 
One interpretation of this is the powerful ‘imposition’ of external constraints on French 
policymakers, and indeed policy-making institutions (Andrews 2001; Lordon 2001). 
Furthermore, some have seen this episode as an explicit challenge to the dirigiste policy-
making model more broadly. The initial macro-economic policy, shifting of emphasis 
from redistribution and employment to a strong currency, tackling inflation and 
budgetary austerity, formed the springboard for an ‘across-the-board assault on the 
dirigiste model, with reforms extending to policies and practices that had little or no 
bearing on the value of the franc’ (Levy 2000, 324). Whilst there is an element of truth in 
both these accounts, on closer inspection, significant qualification is required. 
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Firstly, it is important to note the congruence of ‘external’ pressures for reform along 
neo-liberal lines, and priorities of sectors of French policy elites, notably in the Treasury 
section of the Finance Ministry, and in the bank of France. Dyson insists upon the 
domestic as well as international origins of the prevalent economic orthodoxy, which was 
ultimately enshrined in the Maastricht convergence criteria. Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), he argues, ‘can be seen as empowering Finance Ministry and Banque de 
France technocrats and rejuvenating and modernising a domestic tradition of 
conservative liberalism that has always been powerful in these two institutions’ (1999a, 
9). Secondly, the policy paradigm which emerged in the wake of the change still 
contained distinctive French elements, and there was still a distinctly dirigiste flavour to 
policy-making in certain respects. It is important to distinguish, in the French context, 
between neo-liberalism pur et dur and ‘conservative liberalism’ within the French 
financial and administrative elite associated with the Trésor and Banque de France.  
 
According to Howarth, Conservative liberals ‘uphold the self-adjusting nature of the 
market mechanisms and reject state-led reflation. They seek exchange rate stability, low 
inflation, balanced budgets, and commercial and balance of payments surpluses ... [and 
to] import German ‘sound’ money policies and budget and wage discipline.’ (Howarth 
2002, 147) Yet French ‘Conservative liberals’ differ from German Ordo-liberals and 
Anglo-Saxon neo-liberals, notably in their attachment to a welfare state (with spending 
restrictions), a more equivocal commitment to free markets, and an enduring attachment 
to dirigiste instincts. Theirs is also a more equivocal commitment to balanced budgets, as 
shall be amply demonstrated in the empirical sections below. 
 
Conservative liberals retain a somewhat Polanyian concern for some controls of free 
markets, recognising the potentially ‘pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy’ 
(Polanyi 2001[1944], 80). Conservative liberals share Polanyi’s reservations about the 
danger of subordinating ‘the substance of society itself to the laws of the market’ (2001, 
75), and the need for the ‘protective covering of cultural institutions’ (Polanyi 2001, 76) 
to contain the fundamental contradictions inherent in the laissez-faire ‘self-regulating’ 
market system.  
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French conservative liberals accordingly retain an attachment to a dirigiste state sustained 
by the French Republican tradition which marks them out from German Ordo-liberals, 
who see the social market as being secured by the social partners, rather than by the state 
(Ryner 2003, 206-7). As a technocratic doctrine, conservative liberalism is much more 
enthused by the importance, significance and relevance of the expertise of state actors in 
managing economic and social policy than Ordo-liberalism would normally countenance 
(see Howarth, 2002, 147-152; Dyson 1999a). Dyson and Howarth are correct to insist 
that this, rather than fully blown neo-liberalism, was the ‘dominant ideology’ of financial 
and administrative elites in France, and provided the foundations of the cognitive 
framework through which the preparations for the EMU project were framed.  This 
ideational distinction did not feed through into policy differences in the short to medium 
term (see Clift 2003b). However, this remained a powerful undercurrent within the 
French macro-policy community, and it would, when circumstances permitted, re-
emerge. 
 
French Dirigiste Preferences for European Economic Governance 
 
This section sets out a number of key interventions by French policy elites to illustrate 
how French dirigiste preferences translate into proposals for European macroeconomic 
governance and SGP reform. The process of SGP reform itself will then be analysed in a 
later section to establish the degree of ‘fit’ with French preferences.  
 
French policy-makers’ engagement with what they term ‘European construction’ 
illustrates a dialectical process. Ladrech has identified within the ‘Europeanisation of 
French Social democracy’, ‘both a long slow adaptation of French domestic politics and 
institutions to the logic of European integration (especially economic), and an intentional 
engineering of the EU itself to further French interests’ (2001, 40). This characterisation 
in fact transcends the partisan divide. France under governments of both left and right 
have, since the onset of EMU negotiations in 1988, been trying to re-order the Euro in its 
own image, whilst at the same time being constrained by it (Dyson & Featherstone 1999; 
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Howarth 2001). The form of this attempted re-ordering has evolved. Attempts at 
renegotiating the Treaty and Pact in the 1990s have been superseded by reinterpretation 
of the rules and their implementation in the 2000s. 
 
In the field of French macro-economic policy, and indeed the framework within which it 
was created, there has been a protracted and problematic process of French adaptation to 
a European, or more accurately German, economic policy-making style (Dyson 1999a; 
Cole & Drake 2000).  French discourse and policies in relation to EU level economic 
governance, Howarth notes, are consistent with long standing French preferences, and 
rooted in the French Republican tradition (2004a, 1; see also Dyson & Featherstone 1999, 
ch. 2). Calls for EG grew out of a belief that control over economic and monetary policy 
should not be separated, and garnered the perception – rooted in the history of French 
political economy- that low inflationary economic policies can be maintained by 
democratically elected officials, guided by enlightened bureaucrats and advisors 
(Howarth 2004a, 8; Dyson & Featherstone 1999, ch. 2). These sources are directly 
traceable to the dirigiste traditions of French economic-policymaking, or what Shonfield 
called ‘the habit of the exercise of power by public officials over … the economy’ (1969, 
128). Indeed, careful scholarship (Howarth 2004a) has discerned no less than six distinct 
policy positions, rooted in different conceptions of EG. This variety is testament to the 
rich texture of French dirigiste policy traditions, and the power of volontariste policy 
reflexes. 
 
Within these six versions of economic government, it is the ‘stabilisation’ function 
institutionalised at Maastricht and in the SGP that is so often afforded primacy in 
analysing the implications for domestic policy autonomy of the Euro. Gill, for example, 
highlights the ‘rules-based economic constitution’ underpinning EMU, steeped in a 
‘disciplinary neoliberal discourse’ that has shifted the European union towards a 
neoliberal model of capitalism. He also correctly highlights that the ‘new 
constitutionalism’ of EMU favours ‘tight monetary and financial discipline’ and ‘strict 
control over fiscal policy’ (Gill 1998, 9). 
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However, as Howarth argues, this EG as stabilisation version has always been of 
secondary importance within French discourse and policymaking (2004a), pushed aside 
by more dirigiste iterations. Thus Gill’s fiscal discipline has not materialised in the 
predicted form. The difference of emphasis is understandable, coloured by the context in 
which Gill was writing, a conjuncture characterised by fiscal belt-tightening to meet the 
criteria exacerbated by a prolonged slowdown. However, in hindsight, the structural and 
inexorable character of this fiscal constraint has been overstated. As the economic 
conjuncture shifted, it turned out that French governments were not as tightly bound to 
the mast of fiscal rectitude, to borrow Gill’s analogy (1998, 18), as it had first appeared.  
 
In 1997, the Jospin Government’s attempts at institutional re-engineering of the supra-
national economic policy regime advocated a political role in the determination of 
exchange rates, and a balancing of stability with other economic priorities, notably 
employment and growth (see Clift 2003a, chs 6 & 7). Jospin’s four ‘conditions’ on the 
passage to the Euro of the 1997 election manifesto (PS 1997, 12-13) distilled the diverse 
elements of the dirigiste EG aspirations of French Socialists. Notably, Jospin insisted 
that, next to the ECB, there must be established ‘a European economic government, 
representing the people and charged with co-ordinating the economic policies of the 
various nations.’ Jospin further argued that ‘Europe must be social and political,’ 
therefore, ‘we want the relations between participating Euro countries to be founded not 
on an austerity pact [an explicit reference to the German inspired SGP], but on a 
solidarity and growth pact, permitting policies in favour of job creation and social 
cohesion’ (PS 1997, 12-13). 
 
In April 1999 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then Finance Minister, offered a further iteration 
of dirigiste French preferences in relation to the SGP and economic government. The 
euro, he argued, ‘should make us more autonomous in the conduct of our economic 
policies’, and this autonomy should be directed towards the ‘political priority’ of 
employment and growth (Strauss-Kahn 1999).  
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Strauss-Kahn championed the political role of the Eurogroup, an informal structure 
bringing together the Ministers from Ecofin (the Council of EU finance and economy 
Ministers) that represent euro area Member States. Strauss-Kahn afforded the Eurogroup 
a key role in the ‘implementation of Europe's policy mix’ geared towards growth and job 
creation. The ‘Euro-11 has taken up an essential role in strengthening co-ordination of 
economic policies, including fiscal policies, within the euro area’, indeed, Strauss-Kahn 
claimed ‘Euro-11 is the precursor of a European economic government’. Specifically, 
Strauss-Kahn argued ‘Fiscal policies, within the framework of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, should promote strong and sustainable growth, especially in the event of a sharp 
drop in activity. This assumes that we accumulate enough room for manoeuvre during 
periods of high economic growth so that automatic stabilisers can be allowed to act when 
the economy slows down’. The aim was to ‘enable automatic stabilisers to play their full 
part … [making] fiscal policy an instrument for smoothing out ups and downs in the 
economy without compromising objectives for correcting structural deficits’ (Strauss-
Kahn 1999; see also Mathieu & Sterdyniak 2003, 172). 
 
The combined efforts of Jospin’s chief economic advisor Pisani-Ferry and then EU Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy further elaborated dirigiste Euro reform proposals (Lamy & 
Pisani-Ferry 2002; see also Pisani-Ferry 2002). They criticised those who advocated ‘a 
Europe constructed on rules and procedures, whose ideal model of the world seems to be 
one in which there would no longer be a need to make discretionary decisions’ (2002, 
51). Characterising the ECB inflation target of a price increase of between 0 and 2 per 
cent as ‘inappropriate’ (2002, 110), they noted ‘while the Americans have given an equal 
weighting to monetary stability and growth, the Europeans have decided to give their 
central bank the narrow task of ensuring price stability’ (2002, 109).  
 
Pisani-Ferry and Lamy advocated ‘a more French model’, ‘based on an institutionalized 
dialogue [between the ECB and] the political authorities (Eurogroup and Council)’ (2002, 
111), a strengthening of the Eurogroup (2002, 116), and an enhanced role for the ECB 
board, ‘whose role in decision-making and the dialogue with the political pillar 
(especially the Eurogroup) are essential’ (2002, 112). Seeking the abandonment of the 
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ECB’s existing inflation target ‘in favour of a symmetrical target for inflation, expressed 
as a range of, say, 1 to 3 per cent’ (2002, 111), they proposed ‘operational independence 
based on the British model which would, for example, give the Eurogroup the right to set 
(on the basis of a Commission recommendation) the price inflation objective’ (2002, 112) 
 
The dirigiste justification for these reforms is that ‘Economic policy does not boil down 
to a collection of disciplines and rules of good conduct … there are times when it is 
necessary to have the ability to decide and act’ (2002, 114). To this end Pisani-Ferry and 
Lamy sought ‘definition of principles of economic policy for the euro zone …. [which 
would] detail how to use economic policy instruments in times of unexpected shocks, and 
discuss the proper management of budgetary policy in order that it retain its role as an 
instrument of national economic policy’ (2002, 115). 
 
Each instance involved a dirigiste and volontariste approach to European economic 
governance in general, and fiscal policy-making in particular, and an emphasis on 
discretion of national economic policy-makers over EU-level rules. The mooted 
balancing of stability with other economic priorities, notably employment and growth, 
was alien to traditional German ‘ordo-liberal’ monetary arrangements. This represents a 
re-emergence of much of the French agenda from the Maastricht discussions, and a desire 
to flex dirigiste muscles in order to pull macroeconomic policy levers in the face of low 
growth, slowed down by mass unemployment, and in the mid 1990s, prohibitive interest 
rates (see e.g. Moscovici 1997, 58). Dyson notes that the French Socialists in particular 
‘sought to draw a line between embracing rules of ‘sound’ public finance and money and 
taking on the whole apparatus of neo-liberal and monetarist policy discourse’ (1999b, 
202). The aim was for a negotiated rebalancing of the policy mix, notably carving out a 
role for a fiscal policy geared towards growth. 
 
Using the ‘Policy Space’: Domestic volontarisme 
 
Assessment how these dirigiste preferences underpinned the supra-national element of 
France’s dual-level dirigiste strategy will be contextualised with a brief discussion of 
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recent French fiscal policy (see also Clift & Tomlinson 2004, 522-26). In the early 1990s, 
the Socialist Government tackled recession through a decidedly dirigiste counter cyclical 
expansionary fiscal policy, which saw the public deficit rise to unprecedented levels. 
Despite subsequent harsh fiscal consolidation, in a gesture that demonstrated French 
policy-makers’ desire for autonomy, and the uneasy acceptance of the rules-based 
regime, France alone amongst EMU participant countries officially failed to respect the 
deficit target for 1997 (the Government figure was 3.1 per cent). Yet this official breach 
contradicted authoritative indications that the deficit criterion had been met (OFCE 2000, 
65).1
 
From 1998 onwards, the fruits of economic growth generated more room to manoeuvre, 
and public spending accelerated in 1999 (+2.4 per cent in volume, compared with 
average of 1.2 per cent between 1993 and 1997) (Dupont 2001, 63-5). The extent to 
which French fiscal policy was directed at the Jospin Government’s employment and 
redistributive priorities illustrates the enduring dirigisme of French governments (see 
Clift 2001; Howarth 2002, 150; Cole & Drake 2000). Purchasing power as a proportion 
of household revenue increased by 16 per cent between 1997 and 2002 (Clift 2003a, 159-
161). The fruits of growth were used to embark, in 2000, on the biggest tax cut in 20 
years. All of this saw deficits rise, particularly as growth faltered in 2001. The breach of 
the 3 per cent deficit ceiling, compounded by perceived squandering of the fruits of 
growth, began to incur the wrath of the European Commission. 
 
The degree of policy autonomy, both in the early 1990s and a decade later, is 
considerable, and gives the lie to the supposed tight constraints of a neoliberal EMU 
straitjacket (Gill 1998). French governments have clearly taken a sanguine view of future 
debt conditions and present deficit constraints. A degree of fiscal policy autonomy is 
further demonstrated in relation to where the tax burden falls in France. Swank has 
demonstrated (2002) that the mooted shift of the fiscal burden from more mobile capital 
to less mobile labour in the wake of increased capital mobility has been greatly 
exaggerated. The European Commission has also noted that capital’s tax burden has 
remained broadly stable over the last three decades (European Commission 2000, 67). 
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The policies of the Jospin government 1997-2002 provide partial corroboration of this 
point. The period after 1983 had seen a marked shift in the tax burden increasing taxation 
on labour, and reducing it upon capital. However, after 1997, there was a marked reversal 
of this trend.2 While the tax burden of earners (particularly lower earners) was lessened, 
the Jospin Government introduced a 15 per cent tax on profits in 1997, reduced to 10 per 
cent in 1999, and replaced, in 2000, by a contribution sociale on profits to part finance 
reduced social charges of lower earners. Furthermore, a number of exemptions and tax 
breaks for firms were removed (Dupont 2000, 68-9). 
 
The role of automatic stabilizers clearly retained their importance within the French fiscal 
policy framework (Strauss-Kahn 1999; Clift & Tomlinson 2004). In addition to allowing 
the free play of automatic stabilisers, French governments have also been more explicitly 
dirigiste, taking discretionary measures to support growth and employment over and 
above the automatic stabilisers. The starkest examples of activist employment policies 
came under Jospin’s Socialist Government (Clift 2003a, 166-175). Amongst these, the 
35-hour week stands out as a slight return to the ‘heroic’ policymaking style of earlier 
dirigiste French governments (Schmidt, 1996, 50-55). The estimated 110bn franc cost of 
the policy was met through a mixture of ‘cost-shuffling’ and increased public debt (Levy 
2001, 204).  
 
The dirigiste instincts to exploit and indeed expand policy space continued under 
Raffarin’s Centre Right Government form 2002 onwards. France’s sharply expansionary 
fiscal policy in 2002 (Clift & Tomlinson 2004, 525) gave way to a slightly restrictive 
stance in 2003. That said, French Government deficit forecasts had to be repeatedly 
revised upwards (OFCE 2004, 8), and fiscal policy in 2004 proved less restrictive than 
both the stability plan, and indeed the Budget had predicted (OFCE 2004, 6-7).3 Health 
Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy claimed health insurance reform plans would save 3.5 bn 
euros by 20074 by reducing the government’s burden through increasing co-payment for 
doctors and hospital visits, substituting generic drugs for brand name drugs, and 
introducing a primary care physician as a ‘gatekeeper’, ending self-referral to multiple 
doctors and specialists (see Levy 2005: 186). The Government felt such a restrictive 
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budgetary measure could damage growth and dampen the economic recovery (Sterdyniak 
2004, 8), and accordingly delayed reforms, clearly perceiving an absence of tight fiscal 
constraint. Furthermore, the Finance Ministry predicted that Douste-Blazy’s reforms 
introduced in June 2004 were set to fall short of the savings promised to Brussels in the 
2003 stability plan.5 Indeed, despite difficult public finance conditions, and Commission 
pressure, French fiscal policy has remained surprisingly unrestrictive. Interventionism to 
support economic growth is, it appears, a powerful policy reflex. 
 
The costs of the new political economy of dirigisme are considerable, particularly when a 
generous welfare system predicated on social insurance assuming full employment co-
exists with prolonged high long term unemployment (Palier 2002). Government debt rose 
from 20 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 64 per cent of GDP in 2004. Yet the dirigiste policy 
arsenal provides ways of enabling ongoing and costly interventions to be pursued (in the 
dirigiste faith that such interventions are beneficial to France’s economic prospects, and 
thus the fruits of future superior economic growth will in time repay current spending). 
Specifically, the restructuring of French capitalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
proved a valuable means of bank-rolling interventionist measures in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Given the draw on the public purse of debt servicing, tax cuts, and delayed 
spending reductions, receipts from the Government’s privatisations programme provided 
a valuable source of income – (50 billion francs per year between 1997 and 1999), which 
also helped contribute to and social spending priorities (Clift 2003b; 2004). This episode 
is eloquent testimony to how the traditional dirigisme with which this article began is on 
the wane.  
 
However, this very process of drawing back from old-style dirigisme opens up 
opportunities for dirigiste instincts to find their expression in different contexts and novel 
forms.  The 3 per cent of GDP deficit target may well be met for 2005.6 However, this is 
certainly not solely due to fiscal prudence, nor unexpectedly strong growth in 2004. It 
results more directly from the payment of 7,7 billion euros to the Treasury by EDF-GDF 
in return for the state taking on their pension obligations.7 By such means are French 
governments able to square the circle of using often expensive dirigiste policy levers to 
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manipulate the French economy, whilst at the same time avoiding so significant a 
deterioration of public finances as to generate a crisis.  
 
The Political Economy of French Fiscal Policy and the SGP: Constrained discretion, 
or discreet latitude? 
 
Turning now to the supranational institutional re-engineering element of France’s 
dirigiste dual-level strategy, the rationale underpinning the SGP must be briefly set out. 
The SGP reflects concerns, particularly heightened amongst the sound money and finance 
policy elites at the core of the construction of EMU, that within monetary union 
individual national governments would face looser constraints, and temptations to ‘free 
ride’.  
 
This, it was feared, could potentially lead to damaging spillover effects from national 
policies to the wider Eurozone (see e.g. Clift & Tomlinson 2004, 520-22; Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz 1998; Eijffinger and Hahn 2000, 81-87).  Spillovers could arise because 
with a fixed exchange rate, national government borrowing would no longer involve any 
exchange rate risk, assuming continued adherence to the Euro. Three main elements were 
put in place to limit ‘bad behaviour’ by national governments in the context of EMU. 
First, there is the ‘no bail-out’ rule, indicating to financial institutions lending to 
individual governments that such lending would be guaranteed by the Union as a whole. 
Second, there are limits on bank holding of government debt to prevent excessive 
monetising of the debt and the risk that excessive borrowing could threaten the stability 
of financial institutions (Crawford 1996, 304 –307). Finally, there is the SGP with its 
rules about the fiscal policies of individual governments.8
 
The SGP reflected a German-led insistence on a tough regime, re-asserting not only the 3 
per cent deficit and 60 per cent debt ceilings, but also inserting a medium-term aim of a 
budget ‘close to balance or in surplus’. The Pact obliges governments to submit an annual 
stability programme setting out how these medium-term targets will be met. Only in 
exceptional circumstances (initially defined in terms of depth of a recession) are deficits 
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allowed to exceed 3 per cent. If the rules are breached sanctions and financial penalties 
may be applied (Eijffinger and Hahn 2000, 87-9). 
 
French macroeconomic policy thinking, as has been seen, was always more equivocal 
about the ‘sound money and finance’ agenda which inspired the Pacts’s rules. Attempts 
to rebalance the relative importance of acceptance of the German model in the pursuit of 
‘sound money’ with more familiar, French dirigiste elements have been most consistently 
and successfully pursued in relation to the SGP. Juppé had begun the reorienting process 
at the Dublin European Council back in 1996, with the (cosmetic) insertion of the word 
growth. Under the Jospin and then Raffarin Governments, the reorientations would take 
on a much more concrete and politically and economically significant form. As the 
economic slowdown which began in 2001 drew on, the ‘long game’ French dirigiste 
policymakers had been playing with EMU began to bear fruit. The credibility-bolstering 
rules-based regime and the earlier fiscal consolidation generated policy-space which was 
exploited, heralding a period of ‘unrepentant sinning’ (in the eyes of the European 
Commission) on the fiscal policy front.  
 
Since 2003, there has been a pervasive assumption of the absence of harsh constraint, 
permitting the delaying (in relation to health insurance) or ongoing avoidance (in relation 
to pensions and civil service staffing levels) of tough spending reduction decisions (see 
e.g. Howarth 2004b, 209-220). This should be seen in the context of a dual-level strategy 
seeking to enhance dirigiste room to manoeuvre. The strategy involves various means of 
attenuating the supranational constraint, including the presenting of optimistic growth 
forecasts within the context of SGP-stipulated stability plan which assume away the need 
for politically difficult spending cuts, and speaking duplicitously to domestic and 
European audiences about proposed tax cuts (Clift & Tomlinson 2004; Howarth 2004a).  
 
Despite (or quite possibly because of) these efforts, the Commission became increasingly 
antagonistic towards France. In September 2002, the then European Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Pedro Solbes noted that France was unlikely to meet the 
budget balance target by 2004, and called for stringent efforts to rein in public finances, 
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reducing the structural budget deficit by 0.5 per cent per year (Solbes 2002). France, 
however, refused to endorse the Commission’s deficit reduction proposition. France’s 
September 2002 SGP stability plan, and French Budget plans for 2003 (based upon 
decidedly optimistic growth forecasts), announced the day after Solbes’ rebuke, did not 
conform to the budget balance requirements by 2004, nor even by 2006.  France’s fiscal 
stance, sharply expansionary in 2002, became only slightly restrictive in 2003, and was 
neutral in 2004. France thus remained an ‘unrepentant sinner’ (Mathieu & Sterdyniak 
2003, 154 & 159; Creel et al 2002).  
 
The Commission decided, in May 2003, to initiate excessive deficit proceedings against 
France (and Germany). This created the conditions in which the French tradition of 
seeking to re-engineer European economic governance in a more dirigiste manner at key 
EU meetings reached its zenith, at the Ecofin meeting of 24th-25th November 2003. Here, 
exploiting the Franco-German axis, the French and German Governments managed to 
secure the ‘freezing’ of the Excessive Deficit Procedures. This was against the expressed 
wishes of the Commission and the less vocal desires of a number of Euro member 
countries. In the wake of the Ecofin meeting of November 25th, the SGP was in disarray. 
This created a political crisis for the EU, not least because of the founding assumption of 
the SGP that the Germans would be the model of fiscal rectitude (Dyson 1999a).9   
 
SGP Reform: French policy-makers playing, and winning, the ‘long-game’? 
 
The 1990 rules that evolved into the SGP have been subject to substantial debate. While 
most commentators have accepted the need for fiscal discipline, much ink has been spilt 
assessing the appropriate measure of fiscal prudence, and whether these specific rules 
made sense. Many commentators criticised the SGP as arbitrary: the crude deficit rule, 
for example, made no allowance for the state of the economic cycle, while the debt rule 
did not address under what conditions debt becomes unsustainable. Article 104 of the 
Maastricht Treaty specified analysis of the role of public investment within the deficit, 
and the taking into account of the economic cycle, and the medium term budgetary 
position (Mathieu & Sterdyniak 2003, 148). However, as the process of building the 
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institutional architecture progressed through the 1990s, these cyclical and qualitative 
assessment aspects of Article 104 were largely forgotten. 
 
In the late 1990s, the rules were seemingly being accepted by national governments, even 
if some had to be cut considerable slack (in terms of permitted creative accounting) in 
order to enter the Euro. However, with the slowing down of the European economies 
from 2001, many felt the rules were too restrictive, especially as most Euro zone 
governments started with significant structural deficits (i.e. deficits not caused by the 
cycle). As always, slow growth (and even more, recession) worsens the fiscal position 
and generates political objections to tight fiscal rules. In this case the problem was 
exacerbated by the ECB’s slow response to the slowdown, forcing fiscal policy into a 
more expansionary form (Allsop and Artis 2003, 12-16).  
 
Within a wide-ranging critique of the rules’ economic justification (Mathieu & 
Sterdyniak 2003), focus has centred on the 3 per cent rule, whose breach triggered the 
crises of 2002 and Autumn 2003. When, in October 2002, the President of the EU 
Commission Romano Prodi called the SGP ‘stupid’ because it restricted counter-cyclical 
policy at a time when there appeared no threat of inflation, which was fundamentally the 
problem the rules were supposed to combat,10 this ensured that SGP reform would 
remain high on the agenda. A year before the open crisis of the SGP the Commission 
began to publish its reform agenda. This was a recognition of the ‘cognitive gaps’ (Dyson 
& Featherstone 1999, 784-6) and flaws in the original EMU framework, for example the 
need to allow the free play of automatic stabilizers, without straitjackets of tight deficit 
rules insensitive to the economic cycle, or economic circumstances.  
 
The Commission’s November 2002 proposals, while re-affirming the medium-term 
balanced budget rule, did recognise some of the problems with the SGP. They suggested 
inter alia that the balanced budget rule needed to be linked to the economic cycle; that 
countries should not pursue pro-cyclical policies during periods of growth (so reducing 
their room for manoeuvre in the downswing); and that the overall health of the economy, 
and the sustainability of its debt levels should be taken into account in judging a budget 
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deficit (Begg, Hodson, and Maher 2003, 74-6). Whilst dangling such carrots, the 
Commission continued to wield the stick against France and Germany by taking its case 
against the holding in abeyance of the excessive deficit procedures to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) in early 2004. The ECJ ruling of 13 July 2004 found in favour of the 
Commission and ‘annulled’ the excessive deficit procedure suspension (European Court 
of Justice 2004).11 This heightened the need for a consensus position between Ecofin and 
the Commission to diffuse the open warfare between the Commission and France and 
Germany.  
 
The key elements of such a consensus had in fact been part of the reform debate under 
discussion within the relevant EU institutions for some time (Ecofin 2003; European 
Commission 2002 & 2004a). For example, in November 2002, and again in July 2003 
(when Chirac called for softening of the Pact12), then Finance Minister Francis Mer 
called for a reformed SGP to explicitly take into account new criteria, including inflation 
and levels of unemployment, and not longer be exclusively focused on deficits. French 
preferences continued to emphasise growth, and in September 2004 Mer’s successor 
Sarkozy re-affirmed the desire for the explicit objectives of ‘employment and the return 
of growth’ to be part of a revised pact.13
 
This position began to solidify with the June 2004 European Council’s call to strengthen 
and clarify the implementation of the SGP. The Commission sought to influence the 
shape of SGP reform (ultimately to be decided by the Council), publishing  Strengthening 
economic governance and clarifying the implementation of the stability and Growth Pact 
(European Commission 2004a). Significantly, the emergent consensus is largely aligned 
with French preferences, notably in taking more account of specific national conditions in 
assessing deficits and debt, and in focusing more on the avoiding the potentially adverse 
impact on growth of a rigidly and restrictively interpreted SGP. Indeed, the French 
Finance Minister Sarkozy welcomed the Commission proposals as ‘moving in the right 
direction.’14
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The 3 per cent reference value for the deficit to GDP ratio and the 60 per cent debt to 
GDP remain the ‘nominal anchors’ of the Pact, but in both its 2002 and 2004 proposals, 
the Commission recognised ‘a uniform medium-term target for all countries does not 
appear to be appropriate … [thus] we can enhance the credibility and enforceability of 
our fiscal framework by emphasising the economic rational of the Pact, by taking better 
account of economic fundamentals’ (Almunia 2004, 3). The ‘revised approach’ 
(European Commission 2004a: 3) addresses explicitly ‘how the instruments for EU 
economic governance could be better interlinked in order to enhance the contribution of 
fiscal policy to economic growth ‘(European Commission 2004a, 2). That this refrain 
recalls the volontarisme characteristic of French dirigiste approaches to macroeconomic 
policy, and could have been taken from a speech by Bérégovoy or Mitterrand in the early 
1990s, illustrates the fruits the ‘long game’ has borne. 
 
Although the Commission remained opposed to greater flexibility, the implications of its 
own guidelines are a more flexible, and cyclically attuned Pact (European Commission 
2004a: 4). French dirigiste desires for more political interpretation and discretion in 
applying the Pact’s rules are substantially realised. The Commission introduced 
interpretive caveats including ‘allowing for more country-specific circumstances in 
defining medium-term objectives of “close to balance or in surplus”’ (European 
Commission 2004a, 3). It also envisaged accepting a slower pace of debt reduction if 
growth rates are below potential, and sought to ensure, within SGP interpretation, 
‘sufficient room to manoeuvre of the budget deficit to avoid breaching the 3 per cent 
reference value during an economic slowdown without recourse to pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy.’ (European Commission 2004a, 4)  
 
French policy-makers’ key role in finalising the actual reforms to the Pact 
implementation strategy which culminated at the extraordinary Ecofin meeting of March 
20th 2005 (Ecofin 2005), helped ensure a dirigiste approach, with interpretation by 
elected politicians to the fore. Subsequently affirmed by the European Council meetings 
of March 22nd and 23rd 2005 (European Council 2005), the French dirigiste refrain about 
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enhancing the contribution of fiscal policy to economic growth also found its way into 
the SGP implementation reform document (Ecofin 2005, 22).  
 
In a direct accommodation of French (and German) preferences, the Commission had 
contemplated ‘widening the definition’ of the exceptional circumstances clauses that 
permit breach of the 3 per cent deficit target (European Commission 2004a, 5). The 
March 2005 Ecofin document explicitly states that original interpretations of severe 
economic downturn as ‘exceptional and temporary’ circumstances which justify 
breaching the reference targets were ‘too restrictive’, and that a revised interpretation 
should include ‘accumulated loss of output during a protracted period of very low growth 
relative to potential growth’ (Ecofin 2005, 33). This political (re-)interpretation of the 
conditions under which the excessive deficit procedures are to be initiated is precisely 
what successive French Finance Ministers had argued for between 2002 and 2004. 
French policymakers sought successfully to avoid any automatic mechanism triggering 
the procedures being retained in the revised Pact. At a meeting of Finance Ministers to 
discuss that revision in February 2005, French Finance Minister Hervé Gaymard argued 
for ‘economic policies decided by elected ministers’ to prevail over ‘a pre-established 
auto-pilot’.15
 
Also consistent with French dirigiste preferences, Ecofin’s new implementation strategy 
for the SGP involved a ‘higher degree of economic judgement and policy discretion in 
the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies’ (Ecofin 2005, 22), further 
enhancing role and significance of elected politicians, in part through the Eurogroup. 
French aspirations for a strengthening of the Euro-group had previously received a boost 
with the agreement to elect a leader of the Euro group as of January 2005. Sarkozy 
welcomed the selection of Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker as the first 
‘Mr. Euro’, ‘Europeans will now understand that there is economic government in 
Europe’.16 Whilst this betrays a French tradition of ‘talking up’ the Eurogroup, it was 
nevertheless significant that Juncker, head of the Eurogroup, was also head of the 
Presidency of the European Union as the crucial SGP implementation strategy reforms 
were finalised. 
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One recurrent issue in the reform debate between 2002 and 2005 relates the SGP’s 
‘asymmetry’ problem (Mayes & Viren 2004, 783), namely its failure to constrain 
governments to repay more debt during upswings. In 2002, the Commission raised this 
issue in relation to excessively expansionary French fiscal policy (Mathieu & Sterdyniak 
2003, 159). The original model of the pact seeks to cut deficits and debt loads to increase 
room to manoeuvre for governments over time. Possibly recognising the merits of the 
long-term room to manoeuvre arguments, Jospin’s advisor recognised the need to tackle 
‘insufficient constraint on lax fiscal policies in good times’ (Pisani-Ferry 2002, 2). The 
Raffarin Government was less convinced (Howarth 2004a, 29-31). The final version of 
Ecofin’s the SGP implementation reform document contained an exhortation that 
‘periods of growth should be used for budgetary consolidation’ (Ecofin 2005, 28), but 
contained no specifics or sanctions. This section included numerous qualifications about 
the need for ‘room to manoeuvre’, and for an approach to the medium term objective 
(close to balance or in surplus) ‘differentiated for individual member states to take into 
account the diversity of economic and budgetary positions and developments as well as 
the fiscal risk to the sustainability of public finances’ (Ecofin 2005, 28-30). These caveats 
undermine any constraining effect this section of the revised Pact implementation 
strategy might otherwise have. 
 
French dirigiste preferences favoured a more differentiated approach to deficits, notably 
which aspects of public expenditure are included in deficit calculations. This idea was 
mooted by Mer in June 2002 when he said in a TV interview that the SGP was ‘not 
carved in marble’, and that ‘the content of the Pact, particularly in relation to investment 
… can be to large extent revisited’.17 These calls for a differentiated assessment of 
government spending, affording ‘strategic’ spending - variously defined as research 
(because it promotes future growth), infrastructure, education, and defence – a special 
status and excluding it from deficit calculations were reaffirmed in early 2005.18 As 
Prime Minister Raffarin put it, ‘spending with strategic European implications must have 
a particular status’.19  
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This most ambitious dirigiste manoeuvre to loosen fiscal constraints, which some 
calculate would effectively shift the deficit target to 6.5 or even 7 per cent of GDP 
(Mathieu & Sterdyniak 2005), did not succeed in anything like its maximalist form,20 and 
the ‘redefinition of the Maastricht [deficit] reference value … via the exclusion of 
particular items’ was explicitly rejected (Ecofin 2005, 34). Yet it finds its way, in 
amended form, into Ecofin’s SGP implementation document, which notes that, ‘in order 
to enhance the growth oriented nature of the Pact’, certain structural reforms ‘which have 
direct long-term cost-saving effects, including raising potential growth’ may be ‘taken 
into account’ when defining the ‘path of adjustment’ (Ecofin 2005, 30-31). Furthermore, 
‘policies to foster R&D and innovation’ and ‘public investment and the overall quality of 
public finances’ are both explicitly mentioned amongst the ‘other relevant factors’ to take 
into account before deciding upon beginning excessive deficit procedures (Ecofin 2005, 
34). On those areas less favourable to French preferences, notably pressure to cut deficits 
by 0.5 per cent if the medium term target is not met, the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms is conspicuous.  
 
In the crucial area of enforcement of excessive deficit procedures, even a Commission 
opposed to explicitly recognising greater flexibility conceded that ‘one-size-fits-all 
deadlines for the correction of excessive deficits … can lead to erroneous policy advice 
for instance asking for too stringent pro-cyclical adjustments’  (European Commission 
2004a: 5). As French policy elites had long been advocating, more account is now taken 
of country-specific ‘cyclical developments’, debt levels, and ‘the economic conditions 
and fundamentals of a Member State breaching the 3 per cent reference value.’ (European 
Commission 2004a, 5). Ecofin’s March 2005 revisions echo French preferences for 
greater focus on debt levels, dynamics and sustainability, noting ‘[t]he higher the debt to 
GDP ratios of Member States, the greater must be their efforts to reduce them rapidly’ 
(2005, 35). The revised implementation of SGP strategy agreed by Ecofin also lists a 
range of ‘other relevant factors’ to be considered before pursuing excessive deficit 
procedures. Ecofin’s new approach will give due consideration ‘to any other factors, 
which in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to 
comprehensively assess in qualitative terms the excess over the reference value’ (Ecofin 
© Ben Clift, 2006.         Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK 24
The New Political Economy of Dirigisme 
2005, 34). This has the effect of increasingly the flexibility of the Pact that some, 
including the Commission, were trying to avoid.  
 
In terms of the time horizons for a return to meeting the 3 per cent rule, consistent with 
the Commission’s earlier recommendation to extend France and Germany’s deadline for 
correction their 2002 excessive deficits from 2004 to 2005, Ecofin’s revised 
implementation strategy envisages a possible lengthening. ‘[I]n case of special 
circumstances,’ the report notes, ‘the initial deadline for correcting an excessive deficit 
could be set one year later, i.e. the second year after its identification and thus normally 
the third year after its occurrence’ (Ecofin 2005, 37). This evolution meets a long-
standing French demand reaffirmed in January 2005.21 ‘If,’ the then French Finance 
Minister Sarkozy noted wryly in September 2004, ‘the return under 3 per cent is too 
brutal, there is a risk of dying from the cure’.22
 
The Commission emphasises member states’ ‘peer pressure’ enforcement through 
‘naming, shaming, and if necessary blaming’ (European Commission 2004a, 8). Given 
the experience of November 2003, French policy elites are confident that this will present 
little manifest constraint. The increased emphasis on sustainability of public finances, in 
the current low interest rate context (see Clift & Tomlinson, 2004), also represents a 
softening of constraints for many states. French policy-makers continue to champion a 
‘political’ reading of fiscal rules in keeping with volontariste and dirigiste policy 
traditions. Consistent with these preferences, the string of qualifications, combined with 
the difficulties of measuring the medium term balances accurately have shifted the SGP 
more clearly onto the territory of ‘soft’ law, and make enforcement and decisions about 
breaches more politically difficult to arrive at (see Howarth 2004a, 30-32). 
 
In December 2004, the commission published a communication to the European Council 
assessing France and Germany’s situation in relation to the excessive deficit procedures 
initiated in 2003, and re-activated after the July 2004 ECJ ruling. The Commission raised 
concerns about the vulnerability of France’s budgetary position, questioning levels of 
saving from Health insurance reform, and the one-off payment from EDF-GDF, likely to 
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increase liabilities in the long run.  Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that, since 
France was set to meet the 3 per cent target in 2005, ‘no further steps are necessary at this 
point under the excessive deficit procedure’ (European Commission 2004b, 7). Thus 
French policy elites have successfully played a long-run game, signing up to the 
establishment tough rules to build credibility, then using the policy space so created to 
pursue policies which might otherwise be unsustainable. Subsequently, in relation to the 
SGP, French policymakers have also begun to engage in a revision of those rules to 
introduce greater interpretive flexibility, again without any demonstrable adverse effects 




So solid have been the ordo-liberal sound money and finance foundations of the EMU 
project, and the prevalent perceptions arising from them, that French governments have 
been able to attenuate, indeed neglect, budgetary rigour, without a loss of confidence and 
credibility (or low interest rates). Even the shift from ‘hard’ co-ordination to an altogether 
‘softer’ SGP enforcement and interpretation regime has not demonstrably damaged the 
credibility of French governments.23  
 
The virtues of sound money and sound public finances remain a priority – but they have 
been set in the context of other priorities, and the potential for conflicts and trade-offs 
between them has been recognised as has the need to allow the free play of automatic 
stabilizers, without straitjackets of tight, deficit rules insensitive to the economic cycle, or 
economic circumstances. Credibility could be retained whilst breaching (for ‘sound’ 
economic reasons given the economic conjuncture) the rules. The ‘long-run game’ has 
borne fruit in terms of enhanced policy autonomy. France’s budgetary policy, whilst less 
expansionary than 2002, has not become restrictive. Aided by stronger growth than many 
had anticipated, and some dirigiste creative accounting, France has successfully diffused 
the Commission’s antagonism without effective constraint being wielded upon its 
activist, growth-oriented fiscal policy. 
 
© Ben Clift, 2006.         Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK 26
The New Political Economy of Dirigisme 
Not only has the existing SGP not proved a manifest constraint on French, or indeed 
other Eurozone countries fiscal policy-making in the last few years, but furthermore, the 
Franco German alliance on tax cuts and deficit growth has shifted the terms of the reform 
debate decisively in favour of the kind of dirigiste reorientations long-desired by French 
policymakers. The new iteration of SGP is much more attuned to French preferences, 
demonstrating the success of the ‘long run game’ French policymakers have played in 
relation to the fiscal rules of EMU. Whilst untrammelled fiscal recidivism would 
doubtless damage the credibility of the Euro, with impacts on currency and bond markets, 
clearly the judgement of actors in financial markets suggests that the SGP’s falling into 
abeyance, and France enduring (although, more recently, curtailed) ‘unrepentant sinner’ 
status has not brought us close to that threshold. In macroeconomic policymaking, French 
policymakers’ dual-level strategy has successfully carved out dirigiste policy space at the 
domestic and supra-national levels. 
 
                                                 
1 Meeting (or narrowly missing) the 3 per cent reference target in time for accession to 
EMU involved a certain amount of creative accounting – notably with France Telecom’s 
payment of 45 billion francs to the French state in return for the state taking over future 
pension obligations (OFCE 2000: 65). 
2 The boost in government tax take as growth kicked in was in part due to 22.6 per cent 
rise in company profit taxation. 
3 Those seeking to explain the unexpectedly healthy (2.2 per cent) growth performance of 
the French economy in 2004 point in part to the non-restrictive fiscal policy. 
4 Le Monde, ‘Assurance-maladie : Bercy et le ministère de la santé divergent sur l'impact 
du plan’, 25 June 2004 
5 Le Monde, ‘Assurance-maladie : Bercy et le ministère de la santé divergent sur l'impact 
du plan’, 25 June 2004 
6 Although the IMF remain sceptical about this prospect, ‘France—2005 Article IV 
Consultation Concluding Statement of the Mission’ 11 July 2005, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2005/071105a.htm accessed 10 November 2005. 
7 Le Monde ‘La  soulte d'EDF-GDF permet à M. Sarkozy d'afficher un déficit inférieur à 
3  per cent du PIB en 2005’, 25 September 2004. 
8 The core commitment of the Stability and Growth Pact, is to fiscal discipline and 
stabilization.  It commits states to the  ‘… medium-term objective of budgetary positions 
close to balance or in surplus…’ which ‘… will allow Member States to deal with the 
normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the 3 per cent 
[of GDP] reference value’. Formally, the Pact consists of three elements:- preventive 
elements which through regular surveillance aim at preventing budget deficits going 
above the 3 per cent of GDP; dissuasive elements which in the event of the 3 per cent 
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level being breached, require Member States to take immediate corrective action and, if 
necessary, allow for the imposition of sanctions. Lastly, it involves a political 
commitment by all parties involved in the Pact (Commission, Member States, Council) to 
the full and timely implementation of the budget surveillance process. (European 
Commission 2000: 45-7). 
9 Interestingly, the impact on the financial markets of this open crisis of the institutional 
framework of EMU, which the newly appointed governor of the ECB, Jean-Claude 
Trichet warned was a grave danger for the credibility of the Euro, was negligible. Indeed, 
the collapse of SGP coincided with the highest ever value of Euro to dollar, at the end of 
a 16 per cent appreciation in 2003. Indicating actors on financial markets continue to 
have confidence, long term interest rates. Long-term French sovereign bond rates rose 
slightly from 4.33 to 4.44 (Le Monde, 1 December 2003) – but this was simply a 
fluctuation, and there is no indication of any discernable effect on costs of 
borrowing.Banque de France Bulletin Digest, Nos. 121-123, January- March 2004. 
10 Financial Times ‘Prodi says euro rules are 'stupid'’, 18 October 2002 
11 Le Monde, ‘Pacte de stabilité:  la justice européenne condamne Paris et Berlin’, 13 July 
2004. 
12 Le Monde ‘Déficits publics : plusieurs pays de l'Union disent « non » à Jacques Chirac’, 
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